While the highest good is the foundational concept of every ancient ethical theory, the notion has played a marginal role in contemporary moral philosophy. According to ancient ethical theories and to eudaimonist versions of virtue ethics, when a person treats the highest good as their final end, they develop a moral or virtuous character that expresses itself in a pattern of decisions, actions, and projects that make their life choice-worthy. In this project, I will provide a systematic interpretation of Kantian and post-Kantian views on the highest good. In doing so, my aim is to challenge the widely accepted idea that Kant’s moral theory is one without a notion of value as its fundamental concept (the standard deontological reading). I will argue that Kant’s critical revolution in practical philosophy does not consist in the subordination of all considerations of value to principles of right. Like classical philosophers, Kant believes that the main subject matter of ethics is the nature of the unconditioned good.2 His criticism of pre-critical philosophers is that they mistake the nature of this good. Kant puts freedom, or equivalently, rational agency or the good will, in the place of eudaimonia. A subsidiary aim is to make the case that the highest good should be reinstated as an important theme for contemporary moral philosophy.
University of Notre Dame, Institute for Ethics and the Common Good:
ethics.nd.edu/fellowships-and-grants/fellows/karin-nisenbaum-2025-2026