By Karin A. Nisenbaum
This introduction gives a more exact characterization of the conflict of reason by relating it to Kant’s doctrine of transcendental illusion. As I explain, the conflict of reason arises because we cannot sensibly act on the demands of reason without assuming that their associated conditions for being applied obtain, but on Kant’s view, we can never know that those conditions do obtain. The chapter stresses the importance of Kant’s view that there is a conflict of reason considered in its speculative use, but also a conflict of reason considered in its practical use; as I argue, there is a significant difference between Kant’s diagnosis of and solution to the conflict of reason in each of its two uses, and this has to do with a fundamental distinction between theoretical and practical reason: namely, that while theoretical reason is receptive, practical reason is efficacious. The introduction also provides a chapter outline and draws attention to some of the distinguishing features of the book.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018
- Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
- Society for German Idealism and Romanticism Review
- Hegel-Studien 53/54
- Journal of the History of Philosophy
“Replies to Critics,” Society for German Idealism and Romanticism Review (2020) (with comments by Lara Ostaric, Omri Boehm, and Naomi Fisher)